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Justification by an Infinity
of Conditional Probabilities
David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg
Abstract Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in
degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In
this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on
infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist
stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs
into difficulties.
1 Introduction
Foundationalism and coherentism come in various sorts and sizes, but the difference
between the two is clear: foundationalists hold that basic beliefs justify nonbasic
beliefs while coherentists maintain that beliefs justify one another and that basic be-
liefs do not exist. In some versions of foundationalism basic beliefs depend on basic
nonbeliefs, and in some versions of coherentism some beliefs are more fundamental
than others, but this is a fine structure that for our purposes we may neglect.
To gain a better understanding of the difference, let us consider the simplest of
all belief systems, namely, an epistemic chain. In such a chain, (a belief in) a target
proposition E0 is justified by (a belief in) proposition E1, which in turn is justified
by E2, and so on:
E0 ⇐H E1 ⇐H E2 ⇐H E3 ⇐H . . . , (1)
where En ⇐H En+1 means ‘En+1 justifies En’. Of course, most belief systems are
much richer and more intricate than this. Nevertheless, the chain is a good starting
point: it can help us to understand more realistic cases, which have been represented
as trees, rafts, pyramids, teepees, houses of cards, cobwebs, or crossword puzzles,
all of which have single chains as their elements.
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Now foundationalists will argue that (1) only makes sense if it finally comes to a
halt in a basic proposition corresponding to Es+1, where s is some finite number:
E0 ⇐H E1 ⇐H E2 ⇐H E3 ⇐H . . . . . .⇐H Es+1 . (2)
Coherentists, on the other hand, characteristically claim that the chain will eventually
make a loop, thus supporting itself:
E0 ⇐H E1 ⇐H E2 ⇐H E3 ⇐H . . . . . .⇐H Es{⇐H E0} . (3)
Both (2) and (3) presuppose that the chain is finite. This is in accordance with the
positions of both foundationalists and coherentists, namely, that chains of infinite
length do not make sense. Adherents of infinitism, on the other hand, allow s to go
to infinity; indeed they argue that epistemic chains have the form
E0 ⇐H E1 ⇐H E2 ⇐H E3 ⇐H . . . . . . . . .∞ .1 (4)
In this paper we are especially interested in the viability of infinitism, and so we will
focus on chains like (4).
Some see justification as a normative relation, claiming that the expression ‘En+1
justifies En’ states something about the logical connection between the justifier and
the justified. Others conceive it as an empirical connection, holding that En+1 brings
about En in one way or another. Still others believe that justification is best captured
by a double aspect theory, arguing that it incorporates both normative and empirical
aspects.
Apart from the question of whether justification is normative or empirical, on
which we will remain neutral, there is the issue of strength. How close should the
connection between En and En+1 be in order to say legitimately that the one is
justified by the other? Should we take an austere position and say that En+1 only
justifies En if it logically implies or singly causes En? Or could we be more lenient,
admitting that justification is a gradual concept, allowing a more or less? Today an
increasing number of epistemologists opt for the latter alternative. In an attempt to
make the concept of epistemic justification more general and more realistic, they
prefer to speak about ‘justification’ even if En+1 only probabilistically supports En
(to a certain degree above some threshold).2
In this paper we follow suit and regard the justification relation as a probability
relation. This means that, from now on, we interpret (1) as follows: E0, the target
proposition, is probabilistically supported by E1, which in turn is probabilistically
supported by E2, and so on. To symbolize this adoption of probability we replace the
double arrow⇐H of justification tout court by a single arrow←−, signifying prob-
abilistic support. Thus the chain in which we are interested, namely, (4), becomes
E0←− E1←− E2←− E3←− . . . . . . . . . . . .∞ . (5)
It has often been argued that infinitism must be incorrect because an infinite chain of
propositions, the one justified by another, does not make sense. In the present paper
we will show that such arguments are untenable if the idea that justification comes
in degrees is taken seriously. Once justification is interpreted in terms of probabilis-
tic support, then certain venerable arguments against infinitism become question-
able. Among these are the argument that as yet no example of an infinite epistemic
chain has been found (Black [1], p. 436), the argument that such chains cannot be
completed (Klein [10], p. 920; cf. Lehrer [11], p. 155–56), the argument that the
support given by an infinite epistemic chain always culminates in zero (Lewis [13],
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p. 172; cf. Lewis [12], pp. 327–28), and the argument that “if all justification is
conditional. . . , then nothing can be shown to be actually, nonconditionally justified”
(Dancy [5], p. 55). A variant of the latter argument has recently been put forward
by Gillet, who holds that an infinite regress of deferred justification cannot yield an
unconditional, determinate justification for the target proposition (Gillet [8]).
Against all these arguments we will show that the gradual character of justifica-
tion allows the existence of infinite epistemic chains that may indeed be completed,
yielding a final unconditional probabilistic justification that is not zero. In Sections
3 and 4 we will give detailed examples of such infinite chains, showing that they
can be perfectly consistent. But first, in Section 2, we explain more carefully what
we mean by “probabilistic support,” for that will allow us to formulate our examples
with more precision.
2 Probabilistic Support
We will say that En+1 probabilistically supports En if and only if En is more prob-
able if En+1 is true than if it is false. In other words, the conditional probability of
En , given that En+1 is true, is greater than the conditional probability of En , given
that En+1 is false:
P(En|En+1) > P(En|¬En+1) . (6)
The notion of probabilistic support is closely allied to that of (probabilistic) confir-
mation. There are, however, many measures of confirmation currently on the market
(Douven and Meijs [6]). A popular one is the Carnap [3] degree of confirmation that
En+1 gives to En . It is defined by
D(En|En+1) = P(En|En+1)− P(En) .
Another measure, used by Christensen [4] and Joyce [9], is
S(En|En+1) = P(En|En+1)− P(En|¬En+1) . (7)
The condition of probabilistic support (6) is equivalent to S(En|En+1) > 0. In fact,
since one can show that D(En|En+1) = S(En|En+1)P(¬En+1), it follows that (6)
is also equivalent to D(En|En+1) > 0, provided that P(¬En+1) does not vanish,
that is, provided that P(En+1) 6= 1. Actually all the so-called Bayesian measures of
confirmation are positive if (6) is satisfied (Fitelson [7]; Shogenji [16]).
The rule of total probability is
P(En) = P(En|En+1)P(En+1)+ P(En|¬En+1)P(¬En+1) , (8)
and this may be rewritten in the form
P(En) = P(En|¬En+1)+ S(En|En+1)P(En+1) , (9)
where S(En|En+1) is the Christensen–Joyce measure (7).
For convenience we will frequently make use of the abbreviations
αn = P(En|En+1)
βn = P(En|¬En+1)
γn = S(En|En+1) = αn − βn . (10)
This means that equation (9) takes on the form
P(En) = βn + γnP(En+1) , (11)
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which is a compact way of writing the rule of total probability. Evidently the condi-
tion of probabilistic support as expressed in (6) can be written more succinctly in the
new notation as
αn > βn , or equivalently as γn > 0 .
So αn > βn together with equation (11) are what we mean by ‘En+1 probabilistically
supports En’ or En ←− En+1. To indicate this, we introduce the symbol
En
αn>βn←− En+1 .
Here αn > βn expresses the requirement that γn = αn − βn is positive, the condi-
tion that En+1 probabilistically supports En . With our new symbol, the epistemic
chain (5) becomes
E0
α0>β0←− E1 α1>β1←− E2 α2>β2←− E3 . . . . . .∞ . (12)
In Sections 3 and 4 we will discuss the viability of (12) in more detail. Our over-
all aim is to show that, if one takes seriously that justification comes in degrees,
infinitism is less eccentric than many people think.
3 Finite and Infinite Chains
A standard way of envisaging an infinite chain is first to look at a chain consisting of
s + 1 links, where s is a finite number. So let us consider the finite chain
E0
α0>β0←− E1 α1>β1←− E2 α2>β2←− E3 . . . αs>βs←− Es+1 .
From the rule of total probability in the form of equation (11), we find
with n = 0 , P(E0) = β0 + γ0P(E1)
with n = 1 , P(E1) = β1 + γ1P(E2) ,
and on combining these equations, we obtain
P(E0) = β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1P(E2) .
The iteration can be continued up to n = s, with the result
P(E0) = β0+ γ0β1+ γ0γ1β2+ · · ·+ γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs + γ0γ1 . . . γs P(Es+1) . (13)
For a foundationalist, Es+1 would be the basic proposition that forms the starting
point for the entire chain. Often that starting point has been seen as the report of a
sensation or an impression. Traditional foundationalists such as C. I. Lewis hold that
Es+1 is absolutely certain, so that the probability of this proposition equals unity:
P(Es+1) = 1. Many contemporary foundationalists, on the other hand, are what
Moser et al. have called modest, and what Bonjour has called moderate foundation-
alists (Moser et al. [14], p. 87; Bonjour [2], p. 26). Like their philosophical forbears,
they insist that epistemic chains must be rooted in basic propositions, but unlike
them they hold that a basic proposition need not have probability one. It is enough
if it has a definite (known) probability greater than some threshold of acceptance,
say P(Es+1) > τ . We might think here of the infamous Gedankenexperiment of
Schrödinger, in which P(E0) could be the probability that the cat is alive at time t1,
P(E1) the probability that the hammer breaks the vial of hydrocyanic acid, P(E2)
the probability that an alpha particle that leaves the radium actually enters the Geiger
counter window, and P(E3) the probability that at least one radium nucleus decays
between t0, the beginning of the grisly experiment, and t1. Here P(E3) is supposed
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to have a value that exceeds the threshold τ , and it could be calculated from the
known half-life of radium and the known number of radium atoms in the sample.
Since we are interested in chains of infinite length, it proves profitable to consider
further examples, namely, ones in which the length of the chain, s, is regarded as
a variable, instead of being fixed, as it was in the case of the cat (there s = 2).
The advantage of having s as a variable is that we will be able to investigate what
happens as s becomes very large and ultimately tends to infinity. Below we shall
in fact provide three examples with variable s. In the first example the conditional
probabilities are uniform, that is, αn ≡ α, independently of n, and similarly βn ≡ β
and so γn ≡ γ = α − β. In the second example there is nonuniformity: αn and βn
do depend nontrivially on n, although γn does not, while in the third αn , βn and γn
all depend in an essential way on n.
Here is the first example. Imagine colonies of a bacterium growing in a stable
chemical environment known to be favorable to a particular mutation of practical
interest. The bacteria reproduce asexually so that only one parent, the ‘mother’,
produces ‘daughters’. The probability that a mutated daughter descends from a
normal, not mutated, mother is known to be very small (say, 0.02), but the prob-
ability that a mutated daughter descends from a mutated mother is, on the other
hand, high (say, 0.99). Let En be the proposition: ‘the ancestor in generation n,
reckoned backward from the present, was a mutant’. In this case the conditional
probabilities are αn = P(En|En+1) = 0.99, βn = P(En|¬En+1) = 0.02 and so
γn = αn − βn = 0.97. We are told further that each batch develops from a sin-
gle, mutant ancestor. In this situation, in which all the βn are equal to one another,




1+ γ + γ 2 + . . . γ s
]
+ γ s+1P(Es+1)
= β 1− γ
s+1
1− γ + γ
s+1P(Es+1) . (14)
Note that γ s+1 is not the same as γs+1. The former means “γ raised to the power
s + 1”, while the latter is the Christensen-Joyce confirmation that Es+2 confers on
Es+1—see equations (9) and (10).
Now imagine a batch to be sampled after, shall we say, 150 generations. Then





+ (0.97)150P(E150) . (15)
The original great-great-grandmother, in generation 150 before the generation to be
sampled, is known to be a mutant, so P(E150) = 1, and therefore P(E0) is perfectly
well defined: it works out to be 0.670.
We will come back to the example of the bacteria in Section 4, but for the mo-
ment we may note that P(E150) = 1 is not, as strong foundationalists would insist,
a necessary requirement in order that equation (15) determine P(E0). It may not be
known if the original bacterium was mutated, but it could have been obtained from
a naturally occurring sample, in which the probability of mutation had been deter-
mined by earlier observation of many samples. In this case P(E150) would be set
equal to this known probability: the situation formally resembles the Schrödinger
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cat example, where the originating probability, associated with the decaying radium
nucleus, was known and unequal to unity.
A more extreme situation, and one that even more clearly flies in the face of
strong foundationalists like C. I. Lewis, is when P(E150) vanishes, which would be
so if it were known that the great-great-grandmother in the 150th generation was
certainly not a mutant. It seems that here a strong foundationalist has no choice but
to deny any justification for the mutation in generation 0. However, if P(E150) = 0,
then P(E0) = 0.667
[
1− (0.97)150] = 0.660. Here is a case that fits into the
foundationalist’s requirement of linear finitude, but in which the ‘ultimate ground’, in
this case the mutation of the originating bacterium, is absent, although the probability
that is built up from the conditional probabilities is perfectly definite—and nonzero,
of course.
Lest it be thought that the above considerations rest essentially on the require-
ment of uniformity, let us briefly sketch our second example, that is, a generalization
in which the conditional probabilities are not the same from generation to genera-
tion. Suppose that an effect of an increasing pollution of the nutrient, as a result of
the growing mass of bacteria in it, is that the probability of mutation of a daughter
increases as time goes on, whether or not the mother is a mutant. For example, if
αn = P(En|En+1) = a + bn+1 and βn = P(En|¬En+1) = bn+1, where a and b are
positive numbers such that a + b < 1, then αn and βn are different from generation
to generation, although γn = a is constant. Equation (13) once more reduces to a
finite geometric series that can be summed:
P(E0) = b
[
1+ ab + (ab)2 + · · · (ab)s
]
+ as+1P(Es+1)
= b 1− (ab)
s+1
1− ab + a
s+1P(Es+1) . (16)
A more sophisticated abstract example, our third and last, is one in which γn , as well
as αn and βn , depend nontrivially on n, and, moreover, in which the resulting infinite
series is not geometric:
βn = 1n + 3 γn =
n + 1
n + 2 = 1−
1
n + 2 , (17)
so that
αn = βn + γn = 1− 1n + 2 +
1
n + 3 .
Then
γ0γ1 . . . γs = 12 × 23 × · · · × ss+1 × s+1s+2 = 1s+2
γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs = 1s+1 × 1s+3 = 12 ( 1s+1 − 1s+3 ) ,
so equation (13) reduces to
P(E0) = 13 + 12 ( 12 − 14 )+ 12 ( 13 − 15 )+ · · · 12 ( 1s+1 − 1s+3 )+ 1s+2 P(Es+1)
= 13 + 12
( 1
2 + 13 − 1s+2 − 1s+3
)+ 1s+2 P(Es+1) . (18)
Like the geometric series, this series can thus be summed, and the result written down
in explicit form. In the next section we will investigate what happens to our three
examples when the number of terms, that is, the number of links in the epistemic
chain, becomes infinite.
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4 An Infinity of Conditional Probabilities Can Yield a Determinate Probability
During the past several years, Klein has repeatedly stressed that epistemic justifica-
tion has the character of infinite chains such as (5) or (12). He has defended infinitism
as the one true faith against attacks of foundationalists, who have traditionally argued
that infinite chains do not make sense. As Klein sees it, there is nothing problem-
atic about an infinite linear chain, the reason being that such a chain need not be
completed. What is more, the requirement that an infinite chain must be completed
“would be tantamount to rejecting infinitism” ([10], p. 920). The only thing that an
infinitist à la Klein requires is that for every proposition En in the chain, there is a
proposition En+1 such that the conditional probability P(En|En+1) is known to be
greater than P(En|¬En+1), for that is the condition under which we can properly
say that En+1 probabilistically justifies En .
We fully agree with Klein that an infinite linear chain need not trouble us, but
our reasons are somewhat different from his. For if such a chain is approached by
way of a finite chain in the limit as s tends to infinity, then we are able to show
that the chain can be completed. In the present section we first give an example of a
probabilistic chain that, although infinite, can be completed in the sense that its value
can be computed. This example not only shows that infinite chains of reasons can
exist (contra Black [1]), but it also illustrates that such chains might culminate in an
unconditional justification that yields a number other than zero (contra Lewis [13]
and [12]). Last but not least, the example shows that an infinite regress of deferred
conditional justification can result in a determinate, unconditional justification for
the target proposition (contra Dancy [5] and Gillet [8]).
Consider again the bacterial colonies of Section 3, and particularly the first line
of equation (14), with its remainder term, the product γ s+1P(Es+1). As s becomes
larger, the number of terms within the square braces increases, while at the same
time γ s+1 becomes smaller (recall that γ is strictly smaller than one, and therefore
that γ s+1, the (s + 1)st power of γ , is even smaller). In the limit that s is taken to
infinity, γ s+1 disappears. Since γ s+1 multiplies P(Es+1), which is a probability and
so can never be greater than one, we see that the remainder term vanishes in the limit
that s is taken to infinity. In this same limit the number of terms within the square
braces has become infinite, and so we obtain
P(E0) = β(1+ γ + γ 2 + . . . ) . (19)
Although equation (19) is a geometric series with an infinite number of terms, it can
nevertheless be completed, in the sense that it can be computed exactly. An explicit
form for its sum can be read off from the second line of equation (14), if we use the
fact that, in the infinite limit, γ s+1 disappears. It is
P(E0) = β1− γ . (20)
If we now take, as in the bacterium case, α = 0.99 and β = 0.02, then γ = 0.97 and
P(E0) = 23 . In other words, even though the value of P(E0) is based on an infinite
number of terms, we are still able to calculate it (cf. Peijnenburg[15]).3 This suffices
to show what happens when the number of terms in the first example of Section 3
becomes infinite. The second example (16) similarly has a well-defined limit as s
tends to infinity, namely, b/(1− ab).
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At this juncture, a foundationalist objecting to infinite chains might argue that
our story about the bacterial colonies is not an example of infinitism at all. For no
bacterium has an infinite number of ancestor bacteria, if only because of the fact of
evolution frommore primitive algal slime, which had evolved from earlier life forms,
which sprang from inanimate matter, which originated in a supernova explosion, and
so on, back to . . . to what? To the Big Bang? But it seems that the Big Bang
may well not represent a beginning, in view of the deformation of spacetime. The
whole point here is precisely the question whether or not there was a starting point.
The foundationalist’s postulate that in the bacterial case there was a start begs the
question.
The fact that we can compute a probability from an infinite chain might be good
news for the infinitist, who may now relax the requirement that infinite chains cannot
be completed. But could not the same fact serve as grist to a foundationalist mill?
After all, it seems that a foundationalist might argue that, since the infinite chain
converges to a number that we can compute, an ultimate ground must exist. Could
not the foundationalist claim that it is the limit itself that constitutes the foundation?
The answer is in the negative. For the limit of what exactly is supposed to provide the
ground? It cannot be the limit of the remainder term, γ0γ1 . . . γs P(Es+1), for as we
have seen this term goes to zero as s goes to infinity, and something that fades away
into nothingness can scarcely support an edifice. What about the limit of the entire
infinite sequence? This cannot serve the foundationalist purpose either. The limit of
the sequence is the sum of an infinite number of terms—in our example it is 23 , being
the value of P(E0). This value is, however, the result of the concatenation of an
unending sequence of terms describing probabilistic support; it is not the initiator of
it, for the purported initiator was precisely the remainder term γ0γ1 . . . γs P(Es+1).4
The above considerations are not restricted to cases in which the infinite series is
geometric, as it was in our first two examples. They also apply to our third example.




s+3 vanish, including of course the last term, which carries the probability
P(Es+1) as a factor. The result is P(E0) = 13 + 12 ( 12 + 13 ) = 34 . Here then is a case
in which there is no uniformity, but in which the unconditional probability of the
target proposition can be calculated from an infinite, convergent series of conditional
probabilities.
Once you take seriously that justification admits degrees, then the bullet must be
bitten: in general there is no difficulty with infinite series of probabilistic support.
The reason is that the remainder term usually vanishes in the limit that s is taken to
infinity. Our point is precisely that a perfectly definite probability can be built up
from an infinite number of conditional probabilities, without any need, or room for
an initiating proposition.
5 Afterword: The Bucket Brigade
Our conclusion that an infinite series of conditional probabilities can yield a definite,
unconditional probability value for the target proposition might seem counterintu-
itive, to say the least. How can we ever justify a proposition if its justification is
forever postponed?
The apparent oddity of our result can be illustrated by the saga of the bucket
brigade.5 Suppose there is a fire and Abby has to get her water from Boris, and
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Boris has to get it from Chris, and Chris from Dan, and so on ad infinitum. It would
seem that the fire will never be put out, since there is no first member of the brigade
who actually dips his bucket into the lake.
However, this problem would only arise if we drop the assumption that justifica-
tion comes in degrees. If instead we retain the assumption, and hold that justification
is probabilistic, then the matter is entirely different. Under this assumption, the
proposition ‘Abby gets water’, A, is only partially justified. In fact, we can calculate
the exact probability value of A by applying the rule of total probability that we cited
earlier:
P(A) = P(A|B)P(B)+ P(A|¬B)P(¬B) , (21)
where B reads ‘Boris gets water’. Of course, whether Boris gets water is also merely
probable, and its probability depends on whether Chris gets water, and so on. We
face here an infinite nesting of probability values calculated via the rule of total
probability. As we have seen, we are perfectly able to compute the outcome of this
infinite series in a finite time: with the numbers that we used in the bacterium exam-
ple, the probability of A is 23 . Note that this is completely independent of whether
we embrace an objective interpretation of probability (assuming, for example, that
the firefighters have propensities for handing over the water only now and then) or
a subjective interpretation (in which we specify our degree of belief in A). Both the
objective and the subjective interpretation are bound by the rule of total probability,
and that is the thing that counts here.
All four probabilities on the right-hand side of equation (21), the conditional as
well as the unconditional ones, are supposed to have values strictly between zero and
one (in the interesting cases). Now the traditional view, in which justification is not
gradual, can be modeled by restricting all four ‘probabilities’ to be 0 or 1. Within
this nonprobabilistic approach, Abby either gets water or she does not get water. The
foundationalist moral of the saga about the bucket brigade is precisely that she does
not get water—if the number of brigadiers is infinite. Because this is unacceptable,
the foundationalist thinks that there must be a first firefighter who starts off the whole
rescue operation.
In the probabilistic scenario the existence of a primordial firefighter is not needed,
since the problem that it is supposed to solve does not arise in the first place. If we
take seriously that epistemic support comes in degrees, then the probability that Abby
extinguishes the fire can have a precise value that we are able to calculate, despite
the infinite number of her teammates. As in the examples that we considered above,
this unconditional value is a function of all the conditional probabilities.
Notes
1. Recently, Turri has argued that not only infinitists, but foundationalists, too, can make
sense of infinite chains of reasons (Turri, J., “On the Regress Argument for Infinitism,”
forthcoming in Synthese). In our view Turri’s argument is flawed. We will not go into
the details here, but see endnote 4.
2. Note that interpreting justification as probabilistic support is itself neutral with respect
to the normative-empirical debate. Defenders of the view that justification is normative
will be inclined to a subjective view of probability. Their more empirically-minded
counterparts will tend to an objective and even frequentistic interpretation. But both
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factions are bound by the Kolmogorovian axioms that underlie subjective and objective
interpretations of probability.
3. Equation (20) is the fixed point of a Markov process. Indeed, the stochastic matrix
governing this process is regular, and so the infinite iteration of
P(En) = β + γ P(En+1) ,
is guaranteed by Markov theory to converge to P∗ = β+γ P∗ = β/(1−γ ). This quick
route to the answer only works in examples employing uniform α and β; in the general
case Markov theory does not help.
4. This is one of the reasons why Turri’s argument fails (see endnote 1).
5. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this illustration.
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